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Abstract. We present the Federation Semantic Attribute Mapping Sys-
tem (F-SAMS), a web services based system which enables a semi-
automated dynamic trust establishment mechanism for managing identi-
ty federations. We present the conceptual model which allows current 
members to dynamically introduce new members into the federation in a 
trustworthy manner, using a web of trust model. F-SAMS enables exist-
ing members to interact securely with previously unknown new mem-
bers of a federation and allows them to retrieve policy and semantic in-
formation about them. 
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1 Introduction 
In an ideal world, users would be able to access content on the Internet by simply 
using different subsets of their authorisation credentials (certified identity attributes) 
that are globally known by all service providers (SPs). In reality the only way that a 
user can access content from multiple SPs is for the user to authenticate herself either 
directly with every SP or indirectly via an identity provider (IdP) that the SP trusts, 
which then asserts the user’s identity attributes to the SP. One problem that arises in 
the latter case is how can the SP trust the assertions made by the IdP. The current 
solution is for SPs and IdPs to form identity federations, which create circles of trust, 
where users from an IdP can access the shared resources of the federation SPs.  
Identity federation establishment is usually a manual process, whereby the mem-
bers, or federation operator, will agree on a set of federation terms. Any IdPs or SPs 
who do not agree to support the federation terms will not be allowed to join the feder-
ation. In addition the federation members must establish trust relationships with each 
other (so that the digitally signed requests and assertions can be verified and trusted). 
To do this, the interacting parties typically exchange their public key certificates 
(PKCs). An alternative method is that the PKCs of all the members are regularly dis-
tributed to everyone by the federation operator in the form of signed metadata. This 
semi-automated method enables members to interact with each other without having 
pre-established relationships. However, current federations are relatively static enti-
ties, whose memberships change relatively slowly, and all changes have to be agreed 
by the federation operator.  
1.1 Motivating Use Case 
Our research is driven by the following motivating use case. The number of interna-
tional students studying postgraduate courses at UK universities has been rising year 
on year - almost half of all taught postgraduate students were international in 2010-11 
[3]. University admissions officers are inundated with applications from students 
across the world, with each student required to produce evidence that they have at-
tained the prerequisite qualifications for their chosen course. Currently each student 
presents his/her paper qualification certificates, which have been issued by one of the 
many different worldwide educational institutions. These have different grading 
schemes, different pass marks and different levels of attainment, yet it is the job of the 
admissions officer to determine whether the applicant holds the necessary qualifica-
tions to be accepted on to the course. To do this, the admissions officer must map the 
applicant’s qualifications into ones that are locally recognized by his university (as 
specified in the course prospectus). In addition, he must also check the name of the 
certificate holder against that of the applicant, which can usually be done from the 
applicant’s passport, unless there has been a name change in the intervening period. 
He also needs to be sure that the issuing institution performed similarly strong authen-
tication of the applicant to ensure that the certificate is bound to the same person.  
Currently, the UK university admissions officers have assistance from UK Naric 
(http://www.ecctis.co.uk/naric/default.aspx), which provides a directory of foreign educa-
tional institutions, the qualifications they offer and an estimate of their equivalent UK 
counterpart. However, the information it provides is only advisory and each UK ad-
missions officer must make his own decisions about the trustworthiness and mapping 
of the foreign qualification attribute. Germany on the other hand, has a more ad-
vanced system, in that UniAssist (http://www.uni-assist.de/index_en.html) acts as a trust-
ed third party for the university admissions officers and provides validated mappings 
of the foreign qualifications into their German equivalent. UniAssist validates the 
authenticity of the paper certificates by asking the applicant to take it to the German 
embassy in its country of issuance to be validated and stamped. 
As electronic qualification certificates and electronic ID cards become more preva-
lent, in the not too distant future university admissions officers (playing the role of 
SP) will require an electronic system that can perform the certificate validation for 
them (which is equivalent to validating attribute assertions from unknown IdPs in a 
federation). This has led us to define the Federation Semantic Attribute Mapping 
System (F-SAMS), which allows SPs to securely map unknown attributes from un-
known IdPs into the known attributes used in its access control policy, without having 
a pre-existing trust relationship with the IdP. Similarly an IdP can reliably accept 
attribute requests from an unknown SP, knowing that the privacy of its attributes will 
be preserved. Our F-SAMS system enables IdPs to trust attribute requests from un-
known SPs and SPs to verify and interpret attribute assertions from unknown IdPs. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: section 2 describes the F-
SAMS system, whilst section 3 describes the F-SAMS trust model. Section 4 applies 
F-SAMS to the motivating use case described above, whilst section 5 discusses relat-
ed work. Finally section 6 concludes and considers future work. 
2 The F-SAMS System 
The Federation Semantic Attribute Mapping System (F-SAMS) is a web services 
based system that is added to federations to enable them to dynamically grow so that 
SPs and IdPs can reliably identify and trust one another. F-SAMS serves two purpos-
es. Firstly it provides semantic mappings between (unknown) attributes that are as-
serted by IdPs and a standard set of federation attributes, and secondly it provides 
information about the trustworthiness of the federation members. The standard set of 
federation attributes are defined by the federation root of trust (FRoT). The FRoT is 
the overall authority within the federation, e.g. this could be the organization which 
created the federation. This standard set of attributes is relatively stable, but it can 
evolve over time to meet the changing needs of the federation members. The trust-
worthiness of the federation members is based on a web of trust model which is simi-
lar to the PGP trust model [16]. This allows existing federation members to dynami-
cally introduce new federation members based on their collective recommendations. 
2.1 F-SAMS Protocol Flow 
Fig 1 shows the protocol flow between a user’s agent (such as a browser) and the SP, 
which involves assertions made by an unknown IdP to an unknown SP. The F-SAMS 
service initially publishes two (dynamically changing) sets of (IdP and SP) federation 
metadata that IdPs and SPs will subsequently use to automatically refresh their 
metadata, say once per day (step 1 in fig 1).  The current list from F-SAMS may con-
tain many previously unknown services that the retriever has previously not interacted 
with. When a user wishes to access a federation service, she first navigates her client 
to the F-SAMS service to identify federation SPs (steps 2 and 3). Once identified the 
user agent navigates to her chosen SP and requests access to its service (step 4). The 
SP tells the user agent the standard set of federation attributes it requires for the ser-
vice along with the latest list of federation IdPs (many of which may be unknown to 
it). The user chooses her preferred IdP and the user agent is redirected to it with an 
authentication and attribute request signed by the SP (step 7). The IdP can verify the 
authentication and attribute request from the possibly unknown SP using the metadata 
it has automatically retrieved from F-SAMS, thereby allowing it to trust the SP with 
its attributes (see section 3.1). The IdP authenticates the user and may ask the user for 
consent to release her locally held attributes (steps 8 & 9). The IdP responds to the 
SP’s attribute request and provides the user’s attributes in a signed response (step 10). 
Note that the IdP sends its own attributes to the SP, after checking its local mappings 
to see which ones are equivalent to the requested attributes. It does this for reasons of 
trustworthiness, since the SP relies on trusted introducers to do the mapping from an 
IdP’s attributes to the standard set, rather than relying on the IdP itself (see section 
2.2). The SP receives the signed response from the possibly unknown IdP containing 
possibly unknown attributes about the user. It verifies the IdP’s signature using the 
metadata (PKC) from F-SAMS, then queries F-SAMS to identify the unknown attrib-
utes (step 11). F-SAMS looks up the relationships of the unknown attributes to identi-
fy suitable federation attributes that they can be mapped to. The federation attributes 
are returned to the SP (step 12), which can then make an access decision and return a 
response to the user’s agent (step 13). 
 
Fig. 1. – F-SAMS Protocol Flow 
2.2 F-SAMS Service 
The central part of the F-SAMS service revolves around trust and vocabulary expres-
sion (TruVEx) documents, which are published on the web by each member of the 
federation and the federation root of trust (FRoT). To cater for the different types of 
federation members, there are three types of TruVEx document; one published by the 
FRoT, one published by SPs and one published by IdPs. Table 1 lists the elements of 
each type of TruVEx document. Each TruVEx document is an RDF/XML document 
[17] comprising a set of RDF triples. 
The elements of the TruVEx documents are defined as follows: 
- the PKC part holds the X.509 PKC of this federation member (or candidate  
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FRoT X  X X X  
IdP X X X    
SP X  X   X 
member). This can be a self-signed certificate, or one issued by a CA. The only re-
striction is that it must contain the uniformResourceIdentifier component of the sub-
ject alternative name (SAN) extension and hold the URI of the web location storing 
the detached signature of this member’s TruVEx document. The (candidate) member 
determines this URI at the time its PKC is issued, even though the location will ini-
tially be empty. -­‐ the IdP policy part expresses the IdP’s authentication policy and attribute 
mapping policy. The former consists of the highest authentication level of assurance 
(LoA), as defined in the NIST guidelines [15], that the IdP is capable of performing 
on its subjects. The latter consists of the relationships between the attributes in the 
(candidate) IdP member’s local vocabulary and those in the federation standard vo-
cabulary including whether the local attribute is either registered or authoritative, 
along with the registration LoA (RegLoA) for each registered attribute (see section 
3.3). See [2] for more information on the semantic mappings. The member will need 
to keep this information up to date as and when the IdP’s local attributes and the 
standard federation attributes evolve over time. -­‐ the friends part contains information about each friend i.e. a (candidate) 
member that this member (the introducer) asserts to be trustworthy. This is used to 
create the web of trust between federation members and new candidate members. The 
actual information published for each friend is dependent on the type of friend. If the 
friend is an IdP, the introducer also states its confidence in the attribute mappings 
declared by the (candidate) member. The following is published: 
o Friend Type (IdP) 
o Friend’s PKC 
o Level of confidence (LOC) that the introducer has in the friend to be a 
trustworthy federation member. For an IdP friend, this means that it is trust-
ed to authenticate its users as published in its authentication policy and pro-
vide an accurate authentication LoA to the federation SPs. The LOC has a 
value between 0 and 1 (see section 3.2).  
o Hash value of the IdP policy part of the friend’s TruVEx document that is 
being testified to. This is to ensure that the policy that is being attested to, 
has not been altered since the introducer last validated it. 
o For each attribute mapping in the friend’s IdP policy, the confidence that the 
introducer has in the mapping (AMLOC) and optionally the confidence the 
introducer has in the way the attribute was registered by the IdP (RegLOC) 
(see section 3.3). 
When a friend assertion is made about an SP, the introducer is also implicitly as-
serting its confidence in the SP to abide by its stated privacy policy. The privacy poli-
cy of the SP is published in the privacy policy part of the SP’s TruVEx document. 
The following friend information is published: 
o Friend Type (SP) 
o Friend’s PKC 
o The LOC that the introducer has in the friend to be a trustworthy federation 
member. For an SP friend, this means that it is trusted to abide by its pub-
lished privacy policy. 
o Hash value of the privacy policy part of the friend’s TruVEx document. 
This is to ensure that the policy being attested to has not been altered since 
the introducer last read it. -­‐ the federation vocabulary part is published in the FRoT’s TruVEx document 
and is the set of standard federation attributes that other members will map their own 
local attributes into, either in their attribute mapping part of their TruVEx documents 
if they are IdPs, or in some local storage if they are SPs. In the latter case other mem-
bers do not need to know which local attributes SPs use in their authorization decision 
making). As the federation evolves, the FRoT may dynamically expand the federation 
vocabulary to include other attributes that are of interest to the federation’s members, 
and members may update their attribute mappings accordingly. This allows finer 
grained access controls to be introduced. -­‐ the privacy policy part contains either the privacy policy of the SP member 
or, in the case of the FRoT, the minimum acceptable privacy policy that all federation 
SPs must conform to. A candidate SP will not be accepted into the federation by F-
SAMs if its privacy policy is below this minimum. When a candidate SP becomes a 
trusted federation member, its privacy policy will be copied by F-SAMS and stored in 
its trust base, so that it can be given to IdPs when they request trust information about 
federation SPs. The privacy policy part contains the following information: 
o The member’s name and address, to be used by users in case of a complaint 
or to retrieve a copy of their attributes stored by the SP. 
o The set of SP’s purposes for processing IdPs’ attributes (must be a subset 
of the FRoT’s set). 
o A list of the standard attributes that are processed. 
o A list of third party recipients or categories of third party recipient to whom 
the attributes might be disclosed (must be a subset of the FRoT’s set).  
o A list of countries outside of the European Economic Area to where the SP 
may transfer any of the attributes (must be a subset of the FRoT’s set). 
o The list of users’ access rights to the attributes held about them, taken from 
read, update and delete (must be a superset of the FRoT’s list). 
o The maximum retention period of the attributes (must be less than the 
FRoT’s period). 
Using the private key corresponding to the public key published in the PKC part, 
each (candidate) member signs its TruVEx document and stores the detached signa-
ture at the URI contained in the SAN field of its certificate. 
Fig 2 shows the relationships between six members of a federation as contained in 
their TruVEx documents. Org B, an IdP, has two friends, Org E and Org D, which it 
has introduced to the federation, and one friend, the FRoT, who has vouched for it. 
Org F is currently only a candidate member of the federation, since it has insufficient 
friends at the moment (see Table 2). 
 
Fig. 2.– Example F-SAMS federation 
A web crawler is responsible for identifying, collecting and processing all of the 
TruVEx documents for the federation. Starting at the FRoT’s TruVEx document, it 
crawls the web picking up the TruVEx documents of other federation and candidate 
members. Using these documents, it constructs the F-SAMS certificate, trust and 
knowledge bases, which run as a web service used by the federation members. Once a 
candidate member passes the trust threshold (described in section 3.2), it becomes a 
federation member. 
The notion of a “friend” is used in the TruVEx document to describe an organiza-
tion whose IdP policy or privacy policy is trusted to some degree by the introducer 
asserting the friendship. F-SAMS does not require mutual “friendships”, instead it is 
used as an indication of (partial) trust, or confidence, the introducer has in the subject 
and its published policy. For a candidate member to become a federation member it 
must obtain sufficient introductions from organizations that are already members. 
The TruVEx documents are signed to both prove the integrity of the document and 
to verify the friend assertions. This is similar to a signed X.509 PKC, where the issuer 
asserts that the public key in the certificate belongs to the named subject of the certif-
icate. In the case of F-SAMS, the introducer asserts that it has some level of confi-
dence that the candidate member will honour its published IdP or privacy policy. 






























































provided they ensure the following: -­‐ whenever the document is altered, it must be re-signed and its detached sig-
nature should be stored at the signature URI contained in the SAN field of 
the signer’s PKC. This is to ensure that the signature can be discovered and 
the document’s integrity can be verified. -­‐ if a member changes its PKC, it must inform its introducers, since they have 
published its PKC (in their friends parts). -­‐ if an IdP member alters its IdP policy part, it must notify its introducers so 
that they can verify the modified policy and publish the new hash value and 
their confidence levels in it (in their friends parts). -­‐ if a SP member updates its privacy policy, it must inform its introducers so 
that they can review the changes and publish an updated privacy policy hash 
value (in their friends parts) if they accept it. -­‐ All members may update their friends’ parts of their TruVEx documents as 
often as required without notifying anybody.  
To assist with the automation of informing their introducers, members should 
maintain a list of introducers (LOI) that will contain the email addresses of their in-
troducers. The LOI can then be used to inform the introducers when the member up-
dates its policy. The introducers can either confirm the new policy is valid and update 
their friend’s entry accordingly, or if the policy is no longer valid, the friend’s entry 
can be removed as this member is no longer trusted by the introducer. In the event 
that only some of the attribute mappings are updated, and only some of these are 
deemed to be still valid by an introducer, the entire attribute mapping part does not 
have to be invalidated. Instead the introducer simply gives the unsuitable mappings a 
low (or zero) AMLOC confidence level and the F-SAMS crawler will then decide 
whether they should still be included in the federation knowledge base or not. 
The member’s X.509 PKC information is used for verification of the identity and 
public key of the member. It contains the distinguished name (DN) of the member, 
the member’s public key and the location of the detached signature of the member’s 
TruVEx document (in the SAN extension). Note that a member may assert its own 
identity, by issuing a self-signed certificate, but its friends will validate this when they 
add the member to their friends’ lists. The certificate is used by the crawler to confirm 
the subject’s DN with the one constructed from the friend assertions made by already 
trusted members of the federation in their TruVEx documents. The PKC is also used 
to confirm that the TruVEx document was signed by the correct entity. 
3 F-SAMS Trust Model 
3.1 Trust in Federation Members 
The F-SAMS trust model provides a semi-automated and scalable solution for es-
tablishing trust among federation members. The FRoT is a fully trusted entity by all 
members of the federation, and is the root of the federation trust chains. If an organi-
zation does not trust the FRoT, we assume that it would not want to join the federa-
tion. Trusted paths are constructed from the FRoT to all federation members based on 
the friend assertions within members’ TruVEx documents. This creates a web of trust 
whereby the FRoT trusts its friends directly, and other members indirectly based on 
its friends’ friends, recursively. Hence, all members directly trust the FRoT as the root 
of trust and indirectly trust other members of the federation based on their friend as-
sertions. A candidate member is given a trust score related to the combined confi-
dence levels of all its introducers, which must reach the membership threshold in 
order for it to become a member and receive a trust level. The latter is used to calcu-
late the weight of their own friend assertions about the candidates that they introduce. 
The implicit trust that F-SAMS confers on each member of the federation dimin-
ishes as they move further away from the FRoT in the trust chain. This further dimin-
ishes as the confidence of their introducers is lowered. The trust level (TL) of a mem-
ber is computed by F-SAMS based on their position in the trust chain and the confi-
dence levels of their introducers as follows: 𝑇𝐿 =    !(!"!!)   ×  𝐿𝑂𝐶!"      (1) 
where PL is the shortest path length from the federation member to the FRoT and 
LOCav is the average level of confidence of the introducers as computed in equation 
(4) below.  
A candidate member of the federation only becomes trusted to join the federation 
when its trust score (TS), computed by adding together the confidence adjusted trust 
levels of all its introducers, reaches the membership threshold (typically set to 1). 
Having a membership threshold enables federation trust to remain strong and ex-
cludes any candidate members with a trust score below the threshold until they attain 
the desired trust score. Only then will an IdP’s individual attributes be assessed as to 
whether they are deemed trustworthy enough to be entered into the federation 
knowledge base. The only way a candidate member can become trusted is to increase 
the number of trusted introducers to increase its trust score to meet the threshold. A 
candidate member will require more introducers if it is further away from the FRoT or 
its current introducers have less confidence in it. The TS of a candidate member is 
computed as follows, based on the set of trusted introducers (int): 𝑇𝑆 =    (𝑇𝐿!   ×  𝐿𝑂𝐶!)!:!"#     (2)   𝑇𝑆   ≥ 𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑    (3) 
where TS calculates the confidence adjusted trust score contribution for each intro-
ducer, giving the sum of all introducers’ trust score contributions, where TS must be 
greater than or equal to the membership threshold. By combining the trust and confi-
dence levels of the introducers, the system can decide whether a candidate member 
can be trusted enough to be accepted into the web of trust, thus eliminating the possi-
bility that a rogue member can autonomously introduce new (potentially rogue) 
members into the federation. 
When an introducer refers a candidate member to the federation, it also specifies 
its level of confidence in its assessment of the candidate. This is in the form of a LOC 
variable which takes values between zero and one, where zero means no confidence at 
all and one means full confidence. The LOC in an SP candidate member is the intro-
ducer’s confidence in it adhering to its published privacy policy. The LOC in an IdP 
candidate member is the introducer’s confidence that the IdP will adhere to its pub-
lished authentication policy and will supply SPs with correct authentication LoAs 
during the authentication exchanges.  
When a candidate member becomes fully trusted (i.e. has a TS ≥	
 threshold), F-
SAMS computes LOCav, which is used to calculate the trust level TL of a member in 
equation (1). The calculation for LOCav is shown below: 𝐿𝑂𝐶!" =   !"!  !  !"#!!  !"   !                                         (4) 
where LOCav is a weighted average of the confidence levels of the introducers, 
weighted by their relative contribution to the total trust score. Introducers with lower 
confidence levels (and higher trust levels) will ensure that LOCav does not get too 
high. Members whose trust scores fall below the threshold at any time will become 
candidate members again and their TL will be removed. 
Fig 3 shows an example web of trust that is created by six members plus the FRoT. 
It results in ten trust chains1: FroT à OrgA, FroT à OrgB, FroT à OrgC, FroT à 
OrgA à OrgD, FroT à OrgA à OrgE, FroT à OrgB à OrgD, FroT à OrgB à 
OrgE, FroT à OrgC à OrgE, FroT à OrgA à OrgD à OrgE, FroT à OrgB à 
OrgD à OrgE. Whilst OrgE is trusted within the federation, it alone cannot introduce 
a new member (say OrgF) into the federation regardless of it being 100% confident in 
its assessment, as OrgF’s trust score is relative to OrgE’s own trust level, whichwas 
computed using the average LOC of its introducers. Table 2 shows the trust scores 
and trust levels computed for each organization and its corresponding TruVEx docu-
ment. The TL calculation for OrgE’s TruVEx document illustrates the LOCav compu-
tations from equation 4 above, and shows that compared to OrgD, even though Or-
gE’s trust score is higher, its trust level is lower because its introducers have less con-
fidence in their ratings of OrgE compared to OrgD. If OrgC were to subsequently 
introduce OrgD with a low confidence level (as for OrgE) then OrgD’s trust level 
would be slightly reduced as a consequence of this.  
Candidate members wishing to join the federation have to publish a TruVEx doc-
ument and get trusted members to verify their IdP policy or privacy policy and intro-
duce them. Once enough introducers have been found to give the candidate member a 
TS ≥	
 threshold, they can be trusted and a TL is automatically calculated for them. It is 
the responsibility of each introducer to verify that the policy is correct and sensible. 
However, the burden placed on each introducer is reduced the further they are from 
the FRoT as their TL will be lower, meaning that the responsibility of verifying the 
mappings falls to more introducers. For multiple, intersecting trust chains, each intro-
ducer’s confidence will only be added to the candidate’s TS once, while the TL will be 
calculated based on the shortest path to the FRoT and the average confidence of the 
introducers. 
3.2 Trust in an IdP’s Attributes 
Once trusted, the IdP’s attribute mappings may then be processed. The IdP’s attribute 
                                                            
1 Note that OrgF’s TS is less than the threshold of 1, and therefore it does not have a trust chain 
from the FRoT 
mapping part contains all of the IdP’s asserted attributes and semantic information 
describing how they relate to the standard federation attributes. There are two types of 
asserted attribute: registered and authoritative.  Registered attributes are ones the IdP 
obtained from an external attribute authority when registering the user in its system.  
Fig. 3. – F-SAMS’s trust chains 
Table 2. – TSs and TLs of TruVEx documents from Fig 2. 
TruVEx 
Document 








FRoT n/a 1 Yes 1 
OrgA (1x1)FRoT 1 Yes (1/(1+1))*((1x12)/1)=0.5 
OrgB (1x1)FRoT 1 Yes (1/(1+1))*((1x12)/1)=0.5 
OrgC (1x1)FRoT 1 Yes (1/(1+1))*((1x12)/1)=0.5 
OrgD (0.5x1)OrgA + 
(0.5x1)OrgB 
1 Yes (1/(2+1))* (((0.5x12)/1)+ 
((0.5x12)/1)) =0.33 








((0.33x12)/1.33)) = 0.27 
OrgF  (0.27x1)OrgE 0.27 No 0 
Authoritative attributes are ones the IdP has issued itself and is authoritative for. For 
example, when a student registers at a university, his name and date of birth are regis-
tered attributes, usually taken from his passport, whilst his degree course and marks 
are authoritative attributes issued by the university. Whilst the authoritative attributes 
are simply published along with their mappings to standard federation attributes, the 
registered attributes must contain an extra level of detail regarding how they were 
verified when they were registered with the IdP.  We use the identity proofing aspect 
of NIST’s level of assurance (LoA) [15] to indicate the registration level of assurance 
(RegLoA). For example, if the IdP asserts a name attribute that has not been verified 
and was self-asserted by the user during registration, the IdP’s name attribute will 
have a RegLoA of 1 associated with it. However if the user had to provide a driver’s 
licence and passport in person when registering, then the RegLoA would be 4. 
The introducers of the IdP will assert certain levels of trust about the candidate IdP 
in their friends part of their TruVEx document. These various trust metrics (with val-
ues between 0 and 1) relate to the confidence they have in three aspects of the candi-
date IdP, these are: -­‐ LOC: The confidence the introducer has in the candidate IdP to abide by its 
policy to authenticate a user and provide an accurate authentication LoA to 
the SP, as described previously. -­‐ AMLOC: The confidence that the introducer has in each attribute mapping 
published in the candidate IdP’s attribute mapping part. Stating its confi-
dence in each attribute mapping allows introducers to indicate any suspect 
attribute mappings, without penalising the acceptable mappings. -­‐ RegLOC: The confidence that the introducer has in the RegLoA of each reg-
istered attribute of the candidate IdP (published in its attribute mapping part). 
This gives the introducer the chance to confirm that the candidate IdP makes 
the correct provisions to ensure that their users’ registered attributes are veri-
fied to the level that they assert. 
For each of the IdP’s attributes F-SAMS calculates an attribute confidence score 
(ACS) from the introducers’ AMLOC values, adjusted in accordance with the intro-
ducers’ TL. The calculation for an attribute’s ACS is shown below: 𝐴𝐶𝑆 =    𝛿𝐴𝐶𝑆    (5) 𝛿𝐴𝐶𝑆 = 𝑇𝐿!×  𝐴𝑀𝐿𝑂𝐶!    (6) 
where TLi and AMLOCi are the trust level and attribute mapping level of confi-
dence provided by introducer i, respectively. Only attributes with an ACS that reach 
the ACS threshold (typically 1) will be entered into the F-SAMS knowledge base to 
be used to provide mappings to SPs when the attribute is unknown to the SP. Those 
attributes that do not meet the threshold will not be added to the knowledge base. If 
an SP receives these attributes, it will discard them as unknown/untrustworthy. 
For each registered attribute, its trusted RegLoA must also be determined. The 
IdP’s self-asserted RegLoA needs to be confirmed as reliable before F-SAMS adds it 
to the knowledge base. To achieve this, an attribute registration score (ARS) is calcu-
lated similar to the ACS, based on the RegLOCs provided by the introducers and ad-
justed by the introducers’ TLs (as with the ACS) as follows: 𝐴𝑅𝑆 =    𝛿𝐴𝑅𝑆     (7) 
𝛿𝐴𝑅𝑆 = 𝑇𝐿!×  𝑅𝑒𝑔𝐿𝑂𝐶!   (8) 
where, TLi is the trust level of the introducer i and RegLOCi is the RegLOC provid-
ed by introducer i. If the RegLOC for the registered attribute reaches the RegLOC 
threshold (typically 1), the registered attribute is added to the knowledge base with 
the IdP’s asserted RegLoA. If the RegLOC is less than the RegLOC threshold, the 
trusted RegLoA will be level 1, equivalent to a self-asserted (by the user) registered 
attribute. This is because the combined introducers did not agree with the IdP’s as-
serted RegLoA for the identity proofing used to verify the registered attribute. There-
fore it should be treated by the SP as an unreliable self-asserted attribute. Table 3 
shows an example set of computations for IdP OrgE. For the registered name attrib-
ute, Name (R), F-SAMS will only store the RegLOA of 1, and not the IdP asserted 
RegLoA 4, due to the introducers’ combined confidences falling below the threshold. 





Name (R) Nationality 
(R) 
IdP RegLoA - - 4 4 
















ACS 1.68 1.53 1.6 1.63 
ARS - - (0.5*0.5) + (0.5*0.6) 
+ (0.5*0.5) + 




- - 1 4 
3.3 SP’s handling of an IdP’s attributes 
SPs can receive four different types of attribute from an IdP: a known authoritative 
attribute (the SP can make an authorization decision using this and the authentication 
LoA from the IdP); an unknown authoritative attribute (this needs to be mapped into a 
known attribute by F-SAMS before the SP can make an authorization decision using 
it and the authentication LoA from the IdP); a known registered attribute (the SP 
needs to obtain its RegLoA from F-SAMS before it can make an authorization deci-
sion using it along with the lowest of either its RegLoA or the authentication LoA 
from the IdP); and an unknown registered attribute (this must be mapped into a 
known attribute by F-SAMS, which must also provide its RegLoA. The authorization 
decision is then based on the known attribute and the lowest of the RegLoA and au-
thentication LoA from the IdP).  
4 Use Case 
Returning to the motivational use case in section 1.1, we now show how F-SAMS can 
be used to assist admissions officers in handling electronic international postgraduate 
applications. F-SAMS can utilize the EC’s European Credit Transfer and Accumula-
tion System (ECTS) [4], which standardizes a set of qualifications to levels and cred-
its. This allows students with qualifications issued by an ECTS member institution to 
have their qualifications mapped to the local university equivalent. By extending this 
model with F-SAMS, the ECTS will act as the FRoT, and will publish a TruVEx 
document listing the ECTS members as its friends. This basic model of just the 
FRoT’s friends is the same as the current solution. However, when this federation is 
extended to include the ECTS members’ friends, we can then include educational 
institutions from around the world who have previously had successful interactions 
with a subset of the ECTS members. This will allow other members who have not had 
any interaction with them, to validate their qualifications and map them into recog-
nizable ECTS ones. Not only will F-SAMS help to automate the mapping of unknown 
qualifications through the use of the knowledge base, but it will also help to automate 
the authentication of the qualifications, as the student will present a digital qualifica-
tion which has been digitally signed by the issuing institution and can be validated 
using the trust and certificate base in F-SAMS. 
5 Related Work 
Josang et al. [1] argue that trust must be pre-established between federation members 
in order for them to agree upon the mappings of each user identifier. However, most 
of the literature in the area of dynamic trust in identity management disagrees with 
this view, arguing that it is not scalable (see for example, [9-14]) since these trust 
relationships are not only required to be pre-established, but they must be agreed upon 
by the entire federation, which poses a challenge when a new provider is added. 
The authors of [5, 6, 10 and 14] build on the existing SAML [17] identity man-
agement framework to create extensions to help automate the process of trust estab-
lishment. [5] extends SAML to include the provider’s PKC in the metadata and store 
it at a centralized entity, which can be retrieved when an unknown provider is en-
countered. The unknown provider’s PKC can then be verified using the CA’s certifi-
cate. F-SAMS provides a web service that can provide trust information to requesting 
providers, but it does not require one entity to retrieve and verify all of the providers’ 
PKCs. Rather it builds a trust base from the introductions of other providers. [6] re-
quires providers to request reputation information from a known trusted entity about 
the unknown provider, however, this reputation of trust is built from one trusted third 
party who must know both providers, while [14] extends this reputation request sys-
tem to the cloud, where users can set their own privacy policies to govern how their 
attributes are released. F-SAMS does not require all providers to maintain their own 
trust engines and compute trust at runtime. Rather it can be queried by providers to 
obtain a pre-computed trust score for the unknown provider. [10] combines SAML 
with trust negotiation to allow unknown providers to attempt to prove that they are 
trustworthy at runtime. This negotiation requires each entity to provide credentials 
issued by a trusted third party. [15] presents a model for discovering the trust to place 
in a SP when releasing user attributes, based on a user feedback system. Though it 
dynamically computes trust in SPs, it still requires SPs to have pre-established trust in 
IdPs. [16] allows users to dynamically federate SPs and IdPs, so that IdPs will semi-
trust the SPs to retrieve a subset of the user attributes, and the SPs will treat these as 
user self-asserted attributes. 
While [7] highlights the risks involved in allowing cross federation access to re-
sources and identity information, their model for cross federation trust relies on one 
member of one federation asserting that a provider in another federation is trustwor-
thy. This takes accountability away from the external provider as the introducer is 
responsible for all their actions. F-SAMS shares this burden between multiple intro-
ducers and requires the external provider to become part of the federation, thus mak-
ing them accountable to the federation for their actions. F-SAMS also removes the 
possibility of one member introducing multiple rogue providers to the federation. 
The authors of [8] suggest extending SP and IdP policies to include a required (or 
partially required) set of credentials that an unknown SP or IdP must provide to be 
considered trustworthy. This method of establishing trust still requires a trusted third 
party to issue the required credentials to the unknown provider. The authors of [9] 
take a different approach to trust and allow users to federate their attributes with SPs 
once they have accessed their service. A new SP can request the user’s attributes from 
the previously accessed SP, rather than needing to trust the IdP. The first SP that a 
user accesses must have an existing trust relationship with the user’s IdP. 
All of the current solutions to trust establishment in federated identity management 
require a trusted third party in order to gain trust in an unknown provider. F-SAMS 
does not. It allows existing trusted federation members to introduce unknown provid-
ers, and it then computes a trust score based on these introductions. F-SAMS requires 
all federation members to trust the FRoT, who is responsible for the management of 
the federation. But the FRoT does not need to directly trust all of the members, as 
candidate members may be introduced by existing members of the federation. The 
trust relationships are thus built dynamically from a network of trust. 
6 Conclusions & Future Work 
We have presented F-SAMS, which is designed to address the current limitations in 
dynamic trust establishment in identity management federations. Using the F-SAMS 
trust model, an organization may join a federation by receiving enough introductions 
from existing members who have some degree of trust in it and its policies. We have 
shown how F-SAMS could be used to remove some of the challenges facing universi-
ty application systems, enabling admissions officers to verify and translate unknown 
digital qualifications. In future work, we aim to develop a management interface al-
lowing organizations to easily create, sign and publish their TruVEx documents. 
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